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We have analyzed the monitoring role of outside directors in Japan. A detailed classiﬁ-
cation of each outside director into (1) former bankers;(2) former shareholders;(3) former
cross-shareholders;and (4) pure outside directors reveals that only pure outside directors
increase the turnover-performance sensitivity of inside directors. That is, we found that
the background of each outside director is crucial for his or her role as a monitor.
1 Introduction
An increasing number of countries have published oﬃcial guidelines that stipulate minimum
standards for the participation of outside directors on the boards of listed companies. The
movement toward increasing the number of outside directors is observed not only in European
countries, but also in other countries such as Australia and Brazil. Particularly after the
Asian currency crisis, many countries in the region, including Malaysia, Korea, Hong Kong,
and Singapore, changed their corporate codes in order to increase the number of outsiders on
the boards of publicly traded ﬁrms. Setting aside their actual eﬀectiveness, we can observe
that outside directors have been expected to play a major role in corporate governance in many
countries.
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186-8603, Japan, Phone: 81-42-580-8347, Fax: 81-42-580-8333, e-mail: nabe@ier.hit-u.ac.jp.Japanese listed companies are not yet legally required to have outsider-dominated boards.
The recently revised commercial law, however, promotes the adoption of more outside directors
by providing options to managers.1 Even though the formal new governance system is not yet
generally accepted, an upward trend in the ratio of outsiders on the board can be observed.2
3 As Japanese companies have long been regarded as typical examples of the insider-driven
system, the current movement toward outsider-dominated boards has received attention in both
the academic and the business world.4
Quite naturally, there are an increasing number of studies concerning the eﬀectiveness of
outsiders on the board of directors. One of the most inﬂuential studies is Weisbach (1988),
which ﬁnds that a board dominated by outsiders increases the sensitivity of the turnover of
top executives to ﬁrm performance. Dahya and McConnell (2002) report similar results using
data from the United Kingdom. In his recent survey, Murphy (1999) lists this ﬁnding as one
of the stylized facts regarding CEO turnover.
Most analyses that investigate whether boards with many outside directors make diﬀerent
decisions than insider-dominated boards look at companies in the USA or the UK. Firms in
such countries are known to have very diﬀerent ownership structures than other countries;that
is, in the Anglo-American economies, most shares are held by many small individual share-
holders, whereas in continental Europe and Asia, shares tend to be concentrated in ﬁrms and
families. As outside directors are supposed to mitigate the agency problems between managers
1The revision of the commercial law in 2003 enabled Japanese listed companies to choose either the traditional
statutory audit system or the new, American-style, Company with Committee system. To be registered as the
latter, the company must fulﬁll several requirements, including the adoption of many outsiders to the board. A
Company with Committees does not have to obtain approval from a shareholder meeting for the determination
of proﬁts and the disposition of losses.
2By June 2003, only 40 listed companies, including Sony, Toshiba, and the Hitachi groups, had adopted the
new-style governance system. This number is very small compared with the total number of listed companies
(more than 3000).
3Abe (2004) reports a modest upward trend in the ratio of outsiders to the entire board members in the
manufacturing industry. The ratio was 17% in 1990 and 22% in 2001.
4During the 1980s and the early 1990s, many researchers tried to investigate the unique mechanism of the
so-called Japanese System. One of the excellent surveys along this line is Aoki and Patrick (1994). After the
midle of the 1990s, however, the number of papers that noted negative implications for the Japanese System,
such as the main bank and keiretsu (business group) increased. See, for example, Mork and Nakamura(1999)
and Caballero et al. (2003).
2and owners, or conﬂicts between major and minor shareholders, international diﬀerences in
ownership structures might create distinct implications for the role of outside directors in each
country.5
Compared with the USA and the UK, empirical studies regarding the participation of
outside directors and the turnover of CEOs in other countries are very rare.6 Although there
are by now quite a few studies on Japanese outside directors, the empirical results have been
far from conclusive. Kaplan and Minton (1994) ﬁnd that the appointment of outside directors
substantially raises the probability of turnover of incumbent top executives, as in the USA.
This result can be interpreted as suggesting that, as in the USA, outside directors in Japan
play a disciplinary role. In contrast, Kang and Shivdasani (1995) and Abe (1997) point out
that the presence of outside directors on the board has no eﬀect on the sensitivity of turnover to
ﬁrm performance. That is, contrary to the stylized facts reported by Weisbach (1988), which
describes the situation in other countries, no strong correlation between board composition and
the sensitivity of turnover to ﬁrm performance has been observed in Japan. The objective of
this paper is to explain why previous analyses have not been able to show a consistently positive
role of outside directors.
A director in Japan is deﬁned by the Corporate Code as an outside director if he or she
has never been an employee of the company or of its subsidiary. That is, a director, even if
he or she worked for a major stakeholder such as a supplier, can be regarded as an outsider.7
Nevertheless, signiﬁcant proportions of company shareholdings in Japan are mutually held by
trading partners such as banks and suppliers.8 Because shareholding companies can appoint
5Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) provide an excellent survey of both theoretical and empirical studies on the
outside directors.
6Rather than turnover, some look at the relationship between outside directors and ﬁrm performance. See,
for example, Peng (2004). As Hermanlin and Weisbach (2003) point out, there is no clear relationship between
ﬁrm performance and the ratio of outside directors in the USA. They also argue that, since ﬁrm performance
is aﬀected by many unobservable factors, considering turnover is cleaner than testing the relationship between
board composition and ﬁrm performance.
7According to Miyajima and Kuroki (2003), the market valuation of cross-shareholdings in Japan amounts to
17.6 trillion yen at the end of March 2002, which exceeds the market capitalization of all the listed banks (16.3
trillion yen).
8See Nakatani (1984) and Hoshi, Kashyap, and Sharfstein (1991) for the characteristics of Japanese business
groups.
3a director through a shareholders’ meeting, there is a possibility that an outside director ap-
pointed by a shareholding company has an objective that is diﬀerent from proﬁt maximization.
Let us examine the case of a car manufacturer. Suppose one of the directors was formerly
employed by a major car dealer. Such a director might be more interested in the number that
the former employer might be able to sell than in maximizing the present company’s proﬁts. In
our sample, which covers all the listed companies in the Japanese electrical machinery industry,
61% of outside directors came from shareholding companies, which is far from negligible.
In this paper, we investigate whether the outside directors’ background makes any diﬀerence
to their monitoring role of inside directors, including top executives. More speciﬁcally, we clas-
sify outsiders by their background into two groups, which are “impure” outsiders and “pure”
outsiders. The term “impure-outsiders” means directors who are former bankers or former
shareholders. We further classify “impure” outsiders into three smaller subgroups, which are
bankers, cross-shareholders, and shareholders who are neither bankers nor cross-shareholders,
and investigate their eﬀects on the turnover of inside directors. Figure 1 illustrates the classi-
ﬁcation of outsiders by their background.
Following Weisbach (1988) and other previous studies, we consider the role of outside di-
rectors in determining the turnover of executives. One large diﬀerence between this paper
and others is that we investigate not only the top executives or CEOs, but also other inside
directors. There are several advantages in covering all the insiders. The ﬁrst is that, in
Japanese companies, inside directors are usually more engaged in managing than are outside
directors, and it is generally considered that most Japanese companies are insider-dominated.
As is stipulated in Article 260.1 of the Commercial Law, all directors are engaged in managing
as well as monitoring top executives.9 However, we think that inside directors are required
to manage a company, whereas outside directors are expected to do a better job in monitoring
managers.
The second advantage comes from the number of turnover events of inside directors. Ac-
9The Article says: “The board of directors shall determine the administration of company aﬀairs and supervise
the execution of the duties of the directors”.
4cording to Kang and Shivdasani (1995), the annual likelihood of a nonroutine turnover of top
executives is only 3.1%, which implies that the nonroutine turnover occurs less than once ev-
ery 20 years.10 In contrast, we can observe the replacement of some inside directors almost
every year in many companies as a board usually consists of many inside directors in Japan.
Therefore, it is possible to collect a large amount of turnover data, which gives us a signiﬁcant
advantage in the power of our statistics.
The third advantage of covering all the insiders is its consistency to related studies. An
increasing number of papers have begun to investigate board compensation as a part of the
governance mechanism. Most of those papers, such as Xu (1997), Murase (1998), and Abe et
al.(2004), have used the average compensation of the board. In other words, they investigate
the entire board rather than only the top executives in their analyses of incentive mechanisms
such as pay-performance sensitivities. This paper can be regarded as a natural extension of
these previous studies on compensation.
Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: (1) the turnover of inside directors is
negatively correlated with company performance;(2) without detailed classiﬁcation, outside
directors do not seem to play a major role in the turnover of inside directors;and (3) only “pure”
outside directors increase the sensitivity of the turnover of insiders to company performance
when the ownership is concentrated. These results ﬁll the gap between the former studies on
ﬁrms in the USA and in Japan. We need to classify each outside director by his or her origins to
detect their eﬀectiveness on the board. We also need to consider the entire board rather than
only top executives to show clearly the governance mechanism. The second and third results
cast serious doubts on the eﬀectiveness of the recent moves in the corporate governance system
in Japan;that is, a mere increase in outside directors might not improve monitoring. Thus, to
improve the monitoring power of the board of directors, it is necessary that outside directors
are genuinely independent, i.e., had no previous aﬃliation with the shareholding companies.
10Nonroutine turnover occurs when a president resigns and does not stay in the board as a chairperson. This
deﬁnition is commonly used in turnover analyses in Japan. See Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Abe (1997) for
details.
5The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 states test hypotheses. Section
3 provides a description of the data. Section 4 explains the methodology employed. Sec-
tion 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 discusses endogeneity issues, while section 7
summarizes the ﬁndings and concludes the paper.
2 Some Hypotheses
Incentive mechanisms that are aimed to align outside directors’ interest with that of sharehold-
ers, i.e., the mechanism behind their role in hiring and ﬁring management, have been analyzed
for a long time. A pioneering work in this respect is that by Fama (1980) and, many models
have been built on Fama’s argument. A recent model by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) pro-
vides us many testable implications for the monitoring role of outside directors such as: (1) the
presence of outside directors increases the probability of CEO turnover when ﬁrm performance
is poor;and (2) the eﬀectiveness of the disciplinary role by outside directors depends on their
degree of independence. Although their model is quite general, before applying it to Japanese
companies, we have to consider several characteristics of Japanese corporate governance and
business practices. More speciﬁcally, we need to take into account: (1) the roles of directors;
and (2) interﬁrm relationsips such as can be found in business groups in Japan.
Japanese corporate law does not consider CEOs or presidents. Instead, the law stipulates
“representative directors” who are supposed to be the top managers. In each ﬁrm, there are
usually three to ﬁve such representative directors at any one time. As is mentioned in the
introduction, Japanese corporate law stipulates that one of the major roles of board members
is to determine the administration of company aﬀairs. Although most companies have one
president, his or her role as manager is closely tied to the other directors who are mostly inside
directors. Therefore, rather than regarding a president in Japanese companies as equivalent
to a CEO in the USA who is solely responsible for the management, it is more appropriate to
consider that all the inside directors, as a unit, are in charge of management. Based on the
proposition by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), which analyzes CEOs, we set our ﬁrst hypothesis
6to be tested as follows:
Hypothesis 1. The turnover of inside directors and ﬁrm performance are negatively
correlated.
The second hypothesis to be considered concerns interﬁrm relationships among Japanese
ﬁrms. One conspicuous characteristics of Japanese business practice is that a signiﬁcant part of
a company’s shares is often held by business partners that are usually other listed companies.11
Sometimes, we can observe even cross-shareholdings among many companies. As shareholding
companies usually own other companies’ shares for a long time, such practices have been criti-
cized as a mechanism that entrenches managers in their positions and shields companies from a
hostile takeover. If a company owns other companies’ shares not for investment purposes but
to seek other beneﬁts, such as securing business deals, such shareholders may have an incentive
to exercise his voting power to maximize their own beneﬁts. Such an execution of the power
by the outside director may not be consistent with proﬁt maximization of the company whose
shares are held. Outside directors formerly employed by such companies might not be a good
monitor to ensure proﬁt maximization. In much of the related literature, outside directors
are expected to act as monitors who are in charge of removing incumbent managers when ﬁrm
performance is poor. Considering business practices in Japan, the intensity of monitoring by
outside directors might depend on whether they are from a business partner or not because their
degree of independence is highly questionable(Hermalin and Weisbach 1998). Let us assume
that outsiders who are former bankers, former shareholders, or former cross-shareholders are
“impure” outsiders who may have objectives other than proﬁt maximization. If this assump-
tion is correct, the degree of a board’s independence is an increasing function of the ratio of
“pure” outsiders to the board size. If the degree of the independence is positively related to the
existence of “pure” outsiders, the turnover-performance sensitivity of inside directors should be
11Cross-shareholdings have been analyzed in investigations of business groups in Japan that are called keiretsu.
Except for obvious cases such as subsidiaries, it is not an easy task to classify each company into some particular
keiretsu. Traditional ways such as the classiﬁcation by Economic Research Association, which publishes famous
“Keiretsu no kenkyu”, have been criticized seriously by Miwa and Ramseyer (2002).
7greater for the ﬁrm with a greater “pure” outsider ratio. In other words, the hypotheses to be
tested are as follows:
Hypothesis 2. The presence of a “pure” outside director increases the turnover-performance
sensitivity.
Hypothesis 3. The presence of an “impure” outside director does not aﬀect turnover-
performance sensitivity.
In the following sections, we will consider the monitoring role of outside directors by inves-
tigating the above hypotheses.
3 Data
3.1 Data sources
The data on board composition come from “Directors Data” by Toyo Keizai, which contains
detailed information on individual directors such as age, tenure, schooling, position on the
board, and so forth. Our information on company ﬁnancial statements data is from the
NEEDS database. We also use “Major Shareholders Data” provided by Toyo Keizai as the
source to determine the ownership structures. The sample used in this study consists of 192
listed companies and 6660 directors in the electrical machinery industry for the period from
1990 to 1999.12 Firms are deleted from our sample if they were omitted from the list of Toyo
Keizai for some reasons, such as bankruptcy, for this period. We selected our sample this way
in order to exclude the eﬀect of business failure.13 Some data, such as each directors’ shares,
have been obtained from Yuka Shoken Hokokusho, which corresponds to the 10-K ﬁlings in the
US data. To classify directors according to their former aﬃliations, we have used both Major
Shareholders Data from Toyo Keizai and Firm Shareholding Data from the NEEDS database.
12We do not include data after year 2000 because of the change in information disclosure regulations. Before
2000, all the non-ﬁnancial listed companies in Japan had to report the name and amount of each share they held
as long as the ratio of the book value of the share to their capital was over 0.2%. The regulation was mitigated
to 1% in year 2000, which makes it very diﬃcult to create data on cross-shareholdings after year 2000.
13This type of problem may also arise on the data of 1999. However, this confusion disappears because we
have the data set from 1990 to 2000 in initial stage. The information on the existence of ﬁrms in the data of
2000 enables us to exactly distinguish whether the board members of a ﬁrm are to be turned over or censored.
83.2 Descriptive Statistics
3.2.1 Outsiders and board composition
Panel A of Table 1 indicates the board composition of our sample. The average size of the
boards is about 21 directors, which is larger than in many other countries.14 As mentioned
in Miwa and Ramseyer (2003), it is important to note that the number includes statutory
auditors, i.e., kansayaku, on the grounds that the discussions of directors in Japanese ﬁrms
typically include the kansayaku.15 Even if we exclude the statutory auditors from our sample,
the average size of boards is 18, which is still larger than that for US ﬁrms.16
In contrast to the size of the boards, the number of outsiders is very small, which is generally
characterized as a distinct feature in the boards of directors in Japan. As shown in Table 1,
only 32.3% of directors are what Weisbach (1988) terms “outsiders”, which means that most
Japanese ﬁrms are insider-dominated. About 14% of outsiders (4.6% of all the directors) are
from banks. However, it should not be judged from this ﬁgure that relationship between banks
and ﬁrms is weak. As presented in Panel C of Table 1, half of all the ﬁrms have at least one
director from a bank. Although the eﬀectiveness of the main bank system as the governance
mechanism has been under serious criticism, our data show that, during the 1990’s, many listed
ﬁrms kept their ties with banks on the boards.
Directors from shareholders amount to about 20% of our sample, which corresponds to 61%
of outside directors. This ﬁgure is far from negligible and implies that a closer examination
of them is necessary in an analysis of outsiders and their roles. We classify the shareholder
directors into three smaller subgroups, which are bankers (B), cross-shareholders (C), and
shareholders who are neither bankers nor cross-shareholders (D). Note that directors from
cross-shareholders comprise 11.8% of the outside directors.
Finally, we deﬁne “pure” outsiders (E) as directors who are neither former bankers, nor
14See Fukao and Morita (1997) for interational comparisons of corporate boards.
15On the other hand, we do not include executive directors, i.e., sikkou yakuin, in the sample because they
had no legal obligations or responsibilities for managing and monitoring during the sample period.
16In their analysis of board compositions and the mainbank system, Morck and Nakamura (1999) includes
auditors in the boards. They note that excluding auditors from board members does not aﬀect their results.
9former shareholders. There is a wide variety in the backgrounds of the “pure” outsiders.
Some are from foreign consulting companies, and others are university professors or lawyers.
It is considered that the pure outsiders are the most independent group among all the outside
directors.
3.2.2 Turnover of the board of directors
Panel B of Table 1 documents the age and tenure of directors. The average age of Japanese
directors in our sample is 58. We ﬁnd that directors leave their position when their age is
approximately 61 years old. Although not reported in Table 1, the ﬁrst quartile of the age when
directors leave the board is 58 and the third quartile is 64. This implies that the frequency
distribution of the age when directors resign is symmetric to some extent. In other words,
retirement from the position of director in their middle sixties is not common in Japan. The
leaving age of directors is evenly spread between 58 and 61, although there is an extreme case in
which one director kept his position until the age of 92. Our sample shows no explicit common
retirement age for directors in Japan, which is consistent with former studies by Abe (1997).
The tenure of directors is deﬁned as the number of years that the director has been a
member of the board. On average, the tenure of our sample is 8.8 years, although there is
also an extreme case where one director kept his position on the board for 62 years. Figure 1
shows the histogram of directors’ tenure including censored observations. According to Figure
2, more than 75% of board members do not stay on the board for more than 10 years. In
addition, we can observe that approximately 90% of directors resign within 17 years from their
appointment. Panel B of Table 1 shows that the ratio of directors resigning their positions
during the sample period is 13%, which implies that the turnover of directors occurs once in
every 7.7 years. This ﬁgure is close to the median of the tenure reported in Panel B.
Panel B of Table 1 also shows the diﬀerence between the two groups, i.e., insiders and
outsiders. The average age of outsiders is higher than that of insiders by about 2.3 years and
the tenure of outsiders is shorter than that of insiders by 2.7 years.17 We can also conﬁrm that
17These diﬀerences are signiﬁcant according to the t-test and Wilcoxon rank sum test at the 1 % level.
10the diﬀerence between insiders and outsiders from Figure 3, which plots the hazard functions.
Although the hazard rate of insiders increases for 15 years from the appointment, it begins to
decrease gradually and again increases between years 35 and 55. In contrast, the hazard rate
of outsiders increases for 10 years after inauguration and decreases gradually thereafter. The
very diﬀerent features of the hazard functions between inside directors and outside directors
suggest their diﬀerent roles on the boards.
3.2.3 Financial characteristics
Panel C of Table 1 presents the ﬁnancial characteristics of the sample ﬁrms. Firm size is
calculated as the natural logarithm of the total assets denominated by the consumer price
index. Roughly, the mean value of the ﬁrm size is equivalent to 427 billion Japanese yen. As
measures of ﬁrm performance, we adopt return on assets (ROA). ROA is the ratio of operating
income to the total assets.18 The ROA ranges from -14% to 24.8%, with an average of 3.3%,
which is in the neighborhood of its median. Complementarily, we also employ the dummy
variable for negative proﬁt, which is a binary variable that takes unity if the operating income
is negative and zero otherwise.
Panel C of Table 1 also reports the ownership structures. The average shares held by
directors amount to 3.5%, which is larger than their median. At the maximum, 63% of shares
are owned by directors. That is, the distribution of directors’ ownership is highly skewed in the
left direction like the typical distribution of consumer’s income. In each director’s ownership,
the skewness is more enlarged, which can be inferred from the diﬀerence between the mean
value and its median. Ownership by foreign institutions is modest and is 7.3% of all the
shares, which is very small compared with the proportion owned by ﬁnancial institutions. It is
worth noting the proportion of shares held by the “speciall few”, which is referred to as shosu
tokuteisha mochikabu in Japanese.19 As the shares held by the “special few” are unlikely to
18As the numerator, we could use net proﬁt before tax. However, we use operating income as the numerator
because net proﬁt before tax exhibits were extremely volatile during the sample period.
19To be listed in the ﬁrst tier, each ﬁrm has to keep the shares held by the “special few” to less than 70% of
all the shares issued. The special few is deﬁned as: (1) the top ten shareholders; (2) board members and their
relatives in the second degree; and (3) the issuer itself if it owns shares.
11be circulated in the market for trade, we regard this as a measure of ownership concentrations
of Japanese listed companies.
4 Methodology
This section develops the econometric methodology employed in analyzing the duration of board
members in our sample. We begin by introducing terminology common to survival analysis and
then describe the estimation of the hazard function. Let T be a random variable measuring
the duration of time that passes before the occurrence of a turnover of a board director with
a probability distribution F(t)=Pr(T<t ). The corresponding density function is f(t)=
dF(t)/dt. In studying duration data, it is useful to deﬁne survivor function, S(t)=Pr(T ≥ t),
which yields the probability that the random variable T lasts at least to time t. Our duration
data can also be described in terms of the hazard function. The hazard function determines
the probability that a board turnover will occur, conditional on the spell surviving through
time t, and is deﬁned by
λ(t) = lim
∆t→0






As our interest is to examine how variables such as the board compositions and ﬁrm perfor-
mances explain the length of board tenure, we use the proportional hazard model, which has
been widely used in many disciplines. In this model the hazard function is factored as
λ(t,x(t),β)=λ0(t)exp(x(t) β) (4.2)
where x(t) is a vector of time-varying explanatory variables such as ﬁrm performances and age,
β is a vector of unknown parameters, and λ0(t) is a baseline hazard function corresponding to
exp(x(t) β) = 1. Noting that the logarithm of λ(t,x(t),β) is linear in x(t), we can immediately
ﬁnd that β reﬂects the partial impact of each variable in x(t) on the logarithm of the estimated
hazard rate.
The partial likelihood model by Cox (1972) can be used to estimate β in (4.2) without
specifying the form of the baseline hazard λ0(t). Note that our data is individual panel
12data and so we have many observations for each director. This panel structure gives us many
advantages such as controlling for ﬁrm-level ﬁxed eﬀects.20 Consider n directors of boards in
a sample and assume k of the n directors have left the board by the end of the observation
period. The remaining n−k directors are right censored. Suppose the durations are ordered,
t1 <t 2 < ···<t k, and i denotes the director’s turnover at ti.21 The likelihood Li that director




 =1 Y (ti)λ(ti,x  (ti),β)
=
exp(xi(ti) β) n
 =1 Y (ti)exp(x (ti) β)
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exp(xi(ti) β) 
 ∈R(ti) exp(x (ti) β)
(4.3)
where x (ti) denotes the time-varying covariate variables for director  , R(ti) is the set of
directors at risk of turnover at time ti, and Y (ti) is an indicator function for risk, i.e., Y (ti)=1
if director   is still at risk at time ti and Y (ti) = 0 otherwise. The product over i then gives










 ∈R(ti) exp(x (ti) β)
. (4.4)
Finally, maximum likelihood estimates of β can be obtained by numerical maximization of
(4.4).22 23
20Controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects in nonlinear estimation is generally diﬃcult due to the incidental parameter
problem. In our model, however, the problem is less serious since we have more than 90 observations per ﬁrm
on average.
21Here we ignore the case of ties. But the approximated formulations to calculate this likelihood functions are
established by some previous studies. In this paper, we use the Breslow appoximation(Breslow, 1974) which is
an approximation of the exact marginal. The idea of this method is that each of tied times is treated as though
it occurred just before the others. To apply this approximation for ties, the above set-up needs to be slightly
modiﬁed.
22It is important to note that competing risks occur when a spell can end in several diﬀerent ways. For
example, directors can leave his position for two reasons: an involuntary turnover that proxies for being ﬁred
or a voluntary departure that proxies for retirement or ill health. In this case, the above speciﬁcation should
be modiﬁed. Let tj1 <t j2 < ···<t jkj denote the kj times of type j turnovers, j =1 ,2,···,m and let xji(tji)
denotes the time-varying covariate variables for director i at time tji. Then, the partial likelihood function can
be constructed as a similar form of (4.4). Likewise, the Breslow approximation applies in case of tied turnover.
23In this paper, we deﬁne board tenure as the time from when they started as members of the board. Because
the data about exact timing of their inauguration are available from Toyo Keizai, left censoring does not arise.
However, alternative time dimensions can be considered, such as Tunali and Pritchett(1997), who applied the Cox
model to the yellow fever epidemic in New Orleans, and compared three concepts of time dimensions: calendar
time, age, and duration of residency in New Orleans. If we use calendar time as a measure of board tenure, left
censoring necessarily occurs.
135 Empirical Results
This section reports the results of estimations of (4.2). The hazard rate is calculated from
the turnover event of each inside director. As the explanatory variables, we use ROA, board
composition, controlling for ﬁrm size, board size, each director’s ownership, and his or her
age. Model 1 of Table 2 reports the results of the simple regression without ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects.
Model 1 corresponds to Hypothesis 1 without controlling for board compositions. Table 2
shows that the coeﬃcient of ROA is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, which is consistent
with Hypothesis 1 and many previous researches24. Even when the ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects are added
as in Model 3, this result does not change.25
In Model 2 of Table 2, we consider outsiders’ ratio and its interaction with ROA. We ﬁnd
that, although the coeﬃcient of the outsiders’ ratio is signiﬁcantly positive, the coeﬃcient of its
interaction with ROA is not. Therefore, we do not observe monitoring activities by outsiders
in this model. This result is consistent with Kang and Shivdasani (1995) and Abe (1997), i.e.,
that outsiders have no eﬀect on the sensitivity of the turnover to ﬁrm performance. Controlling
for ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects does not change the result, as is reported in Model 4.
By considering the background of each outside director in detail, we can oveserve the moni-
toring role of outside directors. Following Hypothesis 2, we classify outsiders into four smaller
subgroups, which are bankers, shareholders, cross-shareholders, and pure outsiders. Table 3
presents the results of regressions according to the above classiﬁcation. Model 1 shows that
bankers have no eﬀect on the sensitivity of the turnover to ROA. This result is inconsistent
with much of previous researches on the main bank system such as Kaplan (1994), Kaplan
and Minton (1994), and Kang and Shivdasani (1995), which argue that main banks have a key
corporate governance role.26
24Note that most previous research on Japanese data such as Abe (1997), Kang and Shivdasani (1995), and
Kaplan (1994) analyzes turnover of presidents but not inside directors.
25Every company has its own characteristics, such as history, culture, and other environments, that are likely
to aﬀect insiders’ turnover and some explanatory variables such as board compositions. To avoid possible biases,
we need to control for ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects in the estimation. We simply include ﬁrm-speciﬁc dummy variables in
our explanatory variables as in Hermalin and Weisbach (1988).
26As no previous research analyzed turnover of all the inside directors, the inconsistency might not be surpris-
14Model 2 of Table 3 shows that, although the coeﬃcient of shareholders (C) ratio is signiﬁ-
cantly positive, the coeﬃcient of its interaction with ROA is never signiﬁcant. That is, we do
not observe monitoring roles by directors from former shareholders (C). Similarly, we ﬁnd that
cross-shareholders (D) have no eﬀect on the sensitivity of the turnover to ROA from Model
3. As discussed previously, companies connected in business have their ties in shareholdings.
This implies that these cross-shareholders are likely to behave as delegates of those ﬁrms rather
than monitors, even though they are also shareholders. In other words, minority shareholders’
rights might be exploited. In contrast, Model 4 of Table 3 shows that pure outsiders (E)
increase the sensitivity of turnover of insiders to ROA. This implies that only pure outsiders
play monitoring roles.
Next, we check whether the monitoring roles of pure outsiders shown in Table 3 are robust.
Criticisms might come from possible endogeneity in the determination of board composition.
Although we will discuss this in detail later, in this section, following the arguments of Weisbach
(1988), we classify our sample by the degree of ownership concentration. According to Weisbach
(1988), the degree of shareholdings by managers, or degree of entrenchment, is negatively
correlated with the outsider ratio on the board because (1) strong CEOs avoid outsiders, or (2)
there is no need for monitoring. The argument implies that the managerial ownership aﬀects
the board composition. Because most shares in Japanese listed companies are held by ﬁrms
that can be regarded as “stable” shareholders, rather than using managerial ownership, we use
the ratio of the shares owned by the “special few” as the proxy of managerial entrenchment.27
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of board composition, classiﬁed into high and low
concentrations of shareholdings held by the “special few”. The mean diﬀerences between
ing. Let us put one possible interpretation on this result, however. Suppose that the primary role of the main
bank is to insure managers’ position rather than monitoring management. If the existence of bankers implies
the signal of supporting the appointing ﬁrm by banks, having a director from a bank is attractive for managers
because they can keep the position regardless of ﬁrm performance. Therefore, the bankers would not aﬀect the
turnover of insiders.
27In much of corporate governance literature, the diﬀerence between voting and cash-ﬂow rights is used as
the proxy of concentration. To calculate the diﬀerence, we need to set a certain cut-oﬀ level of ownership that
determines the control shareholders. A typical level is 20% as is adopted in La Porta et al. (1999). The
application of the formula to Japanese listed companies is diﬃcult as most companies’ shares are held by many
ﬁrms in small amount, such as 2%. We do not adopt the diﬀerence, rather we simply look at the direct ownership.
15the high and low concentration groups are signiﬁcant for all variables. Several features are
noteworthy. The ratios for the outsiders in the high concentration group are about twice as
large as those in the other group at the 1% signiﬁcance level. In particular, we can observe
that the ratios of shareholders (C) and cross-shareholders (D) in the high concentration group
are much larger than those in the other group, whereas the ratio of pure outsiders (E), on
whom this paper focuses, is only slightly greater in the low concentration group. That is, there
is a negative correlation between ownership concentration and pure outsiders on the board.
Weisbach (1988) shows that a company in which the CEO holds more shares tends to have
fewer outside directors, which implies that only our pure outsiders group corresponds to his
outsiders group.
Table 5 reports the regression results of the full sample and the two partitioned groups.
Model 1 shows that the coeﬃcient of ROA is negative and statistically signiﬁcant as in the
previous tables. Considering that the coeﬃcient of ROA is still signiﬁcantly negative in Model
3 and Model 5, we see that the sensitivity of insiders’ turnover to ROA is robust. Model 5
reports that the only pure outsiders are engaged in monitoring activities, which is consistent
with Table 3. Dividing the full sample into the two groups provides us with more information
about the role of “pure” outsiders. Although, in the high concentration group, the pure
outsiders’ eﬀect on the sensitivity of insiders’ turnover to ROA is still statistically signiﬁcant,
the eﬀects disappear in the other groups. This means that, although the pure outsiders
makes up a smaller proportion of outsiders, they play more active disciplinary roles in the high
concentration group. The result implies that the disciplinary role of outside directors is larger
for a company whose shares are concentrated and managers are protected.
As a robustness check of the pure outsiders’ eﬀects, we consider another measure of ﬁrm
performance. The continuous variables, such as ROA, generally includes some extremely poor
or good values, which often have an unstable eﬀect on the analysis concerned. To cope with
these outliers, we use the dummy variable for negative proﬁt, which is a binary variable that
assigns one if operating income is negative. The introduction of this variable enables us to
16check the stability of the previous results. It is necessary to note that the positive sign of the
coeﬃcient of the negative proﬁt dummy variable means an increase in the insiders’ turnover
rate. The results are summarized in Table 6. We obtain a result that is similar to the case
using ROA as a measure of ﬁrm performance, except for the coeﬃcient of the pure outsiders’
interaction with the negative proﬁt dummy in the full sample.28
Finally, Table 7 reports the results with ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects, which shows basically similar
results to the cases without ﬁxed eﬀects shown in Table 5.
6 Endogeneity Issues
This section discusses whether possible endogenous determination of board composition seri-
ously aﬀects the results we have driven in previous sections. An increasing number of papers
provide theoretical models that show that the board will have more outsiders after the realiza-
tion of poor performances.29 As full consideration of all the endogeneity issues by estimations
of full-information maximum likelihood is prohibitively diﬃcult, we consider whether the de-
termination of board composition is greatly aﬀected by past performance. If the outsider ratio
of the board depends on ﬁrm performance, our interpretation of the empirical analyses might
be incorrect. The reason is quite simple. Let us assume that there is a ﬁrm with poor perfor-
mance. In addition, we assume that the poor performance of the ﬁrm is due to bad governance.
In this case, it is possible that the ﬁrm selects pure outsiders as board members to appeal to
the market by revamping the governance system. Therefore, one might argue that insiders
change, not because the pure outsiders do a good job in monitoring management, but because
there is an innately high likelihood of insiders’ turnover in the ﬁrm.
To check whether the above actions actually happen and create serious biases in our esti-
28Generally, market-based measures of performance are aﬀected by the market’s expectation of the ﬁrm’s future
performance and, thereby, are less clear than accounting-based measures in the causality into the turnover of
directors. Nevertheless, we also did the same work with ROI (rate of return on investment) and obtained a result
that is similar to the case using ROA as a measure of ﬁrm performance.
29Kaplan and Minton (1994) show, by LOGIT regression, that the appointments of outsiders to boards increase
with poor performance. This result also appears in many previous papers, including Hermalin and Weisbach
(1988).
17mates, we ﬁrst plot pure outsiders’ ratio and lagged ROA in Figure 3. If a ﬁrm selects pure
outsiders as board members when its performance is poor, the scatter should slope downards.
In other words, when the lagged ROA is negative, the pure outsiders’ ratio should take a high
value. Figure 3 shows no clear negative correlation between the pure outsiders’ ratio and the
lagged ROA. This means that some ﬁrms have already taken the governance system in which
pure outsiders occupy a large proportion of their boards.
To support the idea that pure outsiders’ ratio and lagged ROA are hardly correlated, we
make use of Arellano-Bond GMM estimation, which is often employed in dynamic panel data
analysis. Table 8 documents the results of two-step GMM estimation. According to the table,
neither ROA nor lagged ROA exert signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the pure outsiders’ ratio, which
suggests endogenous changes in board composition do not cause serious biases in the empirical
results in the previous section.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the monitoring role of outside directors in Japan with
detailed classiﬁcations of each outsider. More speciﬁcally, we classiﬁed each director into
four smaller subgroups, which are former bankers (B), former shareholders (C), former cross-
shareholders (D), and “pure” outsiders (E), and analyzed their eﬀects on the turnover of inside
directors. Our main ﬁndings can be summarized as: (1) the turnover of inside directors
is negatively correlated with company performance;(2) without detailed classiﬁcation, outside
directors do not seem to play major roles in the turnover of inside directors;and (3) only “pure”
outside directors increase the sensitivity of the turnover of insiders to company performance
when the ownership is concentrated. These ﬁndings ﬁll the gap between the previous studies
in the USA and Japan. The outsider deﬁned by Japanese corporate code does not correspond
to the independent directors in the USA. The outside directors who worked for a shareholding
company before his/her appointment cannot be expected to monitor the managers in order to
maximize proﬁts. The ﬁnding in this paper casts serious doubts on the current movements in
18the reform of corporate governance in Japan. Without a strict deﬁnition of being outside, the
notion is not useful for achieving an outsider driven system.
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23Figure 1: Venn diagram illustrating the classiﬁcation of outsiders
AB C D E
Note: Former bankers(total) = A + B
Former shareholders(total) = B + C + D
(1) Former bankers = B
(2) Former shareholders = C
(3) Former cross-shareholders = D
“Pure” outsiders = E
24Table 1. Descriptive statistics for board compostion and ﬁrm characteristcs
Variable Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
Panel A
Number of directors 21.006 18 8.684 7 45
without statutory auditor 18.092 15 8.505 4 42
Outsider dummy 0.323 0 0.468 0 1
Banker dummy(A+B) 0.046 0 0.209 0 1
Shareholder dummy(B+C+D) 0.199 0 0.399 0 1
Banker dummy(B) 0.038 0 0.192 0 1
Shareholder dummy(C) 0.123 0 0.329 0 1
Cross shareholder dummy(D) 0.038 0 0.190 0 1
Pure outsider dummy(E) 0.118 0 0.323 0 1
Panel B
Age of directors 58.405 58 6.450 20 92
Age of insider directors 57.660 58 5.991 20 92
Age of outside directors 59.963 60 7.069 28 91
Age of directors when leaving the position 61.358 61 6.131 36 92
Tenure of directors 8.790 7 7.561 1 62
Tenure of inside directors 9.798 8 8.383 1 62
Tenure of outside directors 7.047 6 5.453 1 39
Turnover rate of directors 0.130 0.111 0.111 0 0.667
Panel C
Firm size(1000 yen) 11.599 11.306 1.563 8.073 15.311
ROA 3.334 3.146 3.696 -14.045 24.843
Negative proﬁt dummy 0.109 0 0.311 0 1
Firm dummy with at least one banker 0.510 1 0.500 0 1
Shares held by each director(%) 0.255 0.006 1.814 0 45.003
Shares held by all directors(%) 3.529 0.531 7.150 0.008 63
Shares held by foreign institutions(%) 7.368 4.499 8.403 0.003 77.991
Shares held by small speciﬁed groups(%) 44.589 41.867 13.563 7.110 82.476
Shares held by ﬁnancial instituions(%) 35.932 37.041 14.616 0.447 71.939
Notes: The sample consists of 192 listed companies and 6660 directors in the electronics industry
for the period from 1990 to 1999. Number of directors includes Statutory directors. Firm size is
logarithm of values of total assets which are adjusted by consumer price index. ROA is the ratio
of opreration income to total assets. Negative proﬁt dummy is a binary variable that equals one
if operating income is negative.














0 20 40 60
Tenure with censored data
































0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Tenure
gaibudum = 0 gaibudum = 1
Insiders and Outsiders
26Table 2. Cox proportional estimates: regression based on insiders’ tenure
Without ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects With ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀects
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ROA -0.046*** -0.039*** -0.031*** -0.047***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017)
Shares held by each director -0.244*** -0.237*** -0.225*** -0.224***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039)
Age 0.561*** 0.535*** 0.544*** 0.545***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.058) (0.058)
Age2 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of directors 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.049*** 0.05***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
Firm size -0.038 0.006 -0.004 -0.004
(0.025) (0.026) (0.208) (0.209)
Outsiders’ ratio 0.886*** 0.072
(0.179) (0.433)
Outsiders’ ratio ×ROA -0.018 0.054
(0.034) (0.046)
Number of observations 17501 17501 17501 17501
Number of subjects 3641 3641 3641 3641
Number of uncensored spells 2159 2159 2159 2159
Log likelihood -1.45E+04 -1.45E+04 -1.43E+04 -1.43E+04
χ2 1950.9 1982.444 2362.649 2364.199
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.064 0.076 0.076
Notes: Number of directors includes Statutory directors. Firm size is logarithm of values of
total assets which are adjusted by consumer price index. ROA is the ratio of oprerating income
to total assets. Year dummies are included in all equations. Standard errors are in paretheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10-, 5-, 1-percent levels, respectively.
27Table 3. Cox proportional estimates: regression based on insiders’ tenure
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ROA -0.051*** -0.05*** -0.048*** -0.028***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010)
Shares held by each director -0.243*** -0.235*** -0.236*** -0.242***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
Age 0.565*** 0.543*** 0.538*** 0.559***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Age2 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of directors 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.017***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Firm size -0.043* -0.02 -0.025 -0.036









Cross shareholders(D)’ ratio 0.908***
(0.297)
Cross shareholders(D)’ ratio×ROA 0.067
(0.072)
Pure outsiders(E)’ ratio 0.414
(0.268)
Pure outsiders(E)’ ratio×ROA -0.145***
(0.055)
Number of observations 17501 17501 17501 17501
Number of subjects 3641 3641 3641 3641
Number of uncensored spells 2159 2159 2159 2159
Log likelihood -1.45E+04 -1.45E+04 -1.45E+04 -1.45E+04
chi2 1953.151 1965.105 1970.225 1957.892
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.063 0.064 0.063
Notes: Number of directors includes Statutory directors. Firm size is logarithm of values of
total assets which are adjusted by consumer price index. ROA is the ratio of oprerating income
to total assets. Year dummies are included in all equations. Standard errors are in paretheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10-, 5-, 1-percent levels, respectively.
28Table 4. Mean diﬀerence in two subgroups: high and low concentraions
Variable high concentration low concentration t-test
Number of directors 18.337 23.721 ***
without statutory auditors 15.378 20.757 ***
Outsider dummy 0.423 0.221 ***
Banker dummy(A+B) 0.037 0.055 ***
Shareholder dummy(B+C+D) 0.313 0.082 ***
Banker dummy(B) 0.032 0.045 ***
Shareholder dummy(C) 0.221 0.023 ***
Cross shareholder dummy(D) 0.061 0.014 ***
Pure outsider dummy(E) 0.107 0.129 ***
Notes: The two subgroups are classiﬁed according to the ratio of shares owened
by the special few, which is considered as a proxy managerial entrenchment.
If, from 1990 to 1999, the average of shousu tokutei michi kabu hiritu of a ﬁrm
is larger than the median of it, the ﬁrm belongs to high concentration group.
In the other case, the ﬁrm belongs to low concentration group. ∗∗∗ indicates
signiﬁcance at the 1-percent levels, respectively.
29Table 5. Cox proportional estimates: regression based on insiders’ tenure
Full sample High concentration Low concentration
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
ROA -0.044*** -0.032** -0.051*** -0.025 -0.031*** -0.038*
(0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.020)
Shares held by each director -0.228*** -0.226*** -0.235*** -0.228*** -0.217*** -0.216***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Age 0.518*** 0.514*** 0.861*** 0.859*** 0.33*** 0.33***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.107) (0.107) (0.062) (0.063)
Age2 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of directors 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.01 0.008 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Firm size 0.007 0.009 0.097* 0.115** -0.032 -0.034
(0.027) (0.027) (0.050) (0.051) (0.033) (0.034)
Bankers(B)’ ratio 0.035 -0.191 0.261 0.124 0.349 0.232
(0.457) (0.559) (0.723) (0.896) (0.595) (0.728)
Bankers(B)’ ratio×ROA 0.09 0.077 0.043
(0.119) (0.192) (0.154)
Shareholders(C)’ ratio 0.822*** 0.811*** 0.748*** 0.796*** -0.085 -0.156
(0.159) (0.193) (0.201) (0.247) (0.649) (0.806)
Shareholders(C)’ ratio×ROA 0.013 0.002 0.026
(0.037) (0.046) (0.148)
Cross shareholders(D)’ ratio 1.428*** 1.313*** 1.161*** 1.079** 1.874*** 1.793***
(0.250) (0.313) (0.326) (0.424) (0.542) (0.573)
Cross shareholders(D)’ ratio×ROA 0.051 0.021 0.05
(0.075) (0.102) (0.118)
Pure outsiders(E)’ ratio 0.55** 0.963*** 0.352 1.228*** 1.164*** 1.106***
(0.244) (0.286) (0.369) (0.437) (0.345) (0.416)
Pure outsiders(E)’ ratio×ROA -0.153*** -0.256*** 0.019
(0.056) (0.073) (0.105)
Number of observations 17501 17501 7002 7002 10499 10499
Number of subjects 3641 3641 1511 1511 2130 2130
Number of uncensored spells 2159 2159 890 890 1269 1269
Log likelihood -1.45E+04 -1.45E+04 -5161.244 -5153.7 -7852.82 -7852.69
chi2 1995.621 2005.502 917.777 932.874 1135.32 1135.587
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.065 0.082 0.083 0.067 0.067
Notes: Number of directors includes Statutory directors. Firm size is logarithm of values of total assets which are adjusted
by consumer price index. ROA is the ratio of oprerating income to total assets. Year dummies are included in all equations.
Standard errors are in paretheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10-, 5-, 1-percent levels, respectively.
30Table 6. Cox proportional estimates: regression based on insiders’ tenure
Full smaple High concentration Low concentration
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Negative proﬁt dummy(NPD) 0.243*** 0.161 0.394*** 0.339 0.08 0.056
(0.066) (0.139) (0.099) (0.214) (0.091) (0.189)
Shares held by each director -0.243*** -0.244*** -0.254*** -0.251*** -0.222*** -0.223***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.053) (0.053) (0.051) (0.051)
Age 0.538*** 0.538*** 0.902*** 0.896*** 0.337*** 0.336***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.107) (0.106) (0.062) (0.062)
Age2 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of directors 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.013 0.013 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Firm size 0.012 0.012 0.08 0.085* -0.028 -0.028
(0.027) (0.027) (0.050) (0.051) (0.033) (0.033)
Bankers(B)’ ratio 0.068 0.181 0.212 0.418 0.411 0.609
(0.457) (0.499) (0.736) (0.788) (0.591) (0.651)
Bankers(B)’ ratio×NPD -0.598 -0.765 -0.901
(1.183) (2.069) (1.482)
Shareholders(C)’ ratio 0.858*** 0.831*** 0.776*** 0.825*** -0.141 -0.501
(0.157) (0.170) (0.198) (0.213) (0.646) (0.703)
Shareholders(C)’ ratio×NPD 0.183 -0.274 2.043
(0.388) (0.491) (1.519)
Cross shareholders(D)’ ratio 1.524*** 1.474*** 1.256*** 1.318*** 2.033*** 1.889***
(0.249) (0.267) (0.326) (0.346) (0.535) (0.632)
Cross shareholders(D)’ ratio×NPD 0.335 -0.74 0.479
(0.678) (0.991) (1.184)
Pure outsiders(E)’ ratio 0.58** 0.48* 0.152 -0.136 1.329*** 1.292***
(0.243) (0.263) (0.364) (0.398) (0.340) (0.366)
Pure outsiders(E)’ ratio×NPD 0.656 1.955** 0.09
(0.637) (0.846) (0.904)
Number of observations 17501 17501 7002 7002 10499 10499
Number of subjects 3641 3641 1511 1511 2130 2130
Number of uncensored spells 2159 2159 890 890 1269 1269
Log likelihood -1.45E+04 -1.45E+04 -5168.211 -5164.95 -7857.36 -7856.33
chi2 1964.205 1965.744 903.842 910.367 1126.256 1128.306
Pseudo R2 0.063 0.063 0.08 0.081 0.067 0.067
Notes: Number of directors includes Statutory directors. Firm size is logarithm of values of total assets which are adjusted
by consumer price index. Negative proﬁt dummy is a binary variable that equals one if operating income is negative. Year
dummies are included in all equations. Standard errors are in paretheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10-, 5-,
1-percent levels, respectively.
31Table 7. Cox proportional estimates: regression based on insiders’ tenure with ﬁrm-ﬁxed eﬀect
Variable Full smaplce High concentration Low concentration
ROA -0.041** -0.042 -0.046*
(0.018) (0.029) (0.026)
Shares held by each director -0.223*** -0.244*** -0.218***
(0.039) (0.056) (0.055)
Age 0.547*** 0.985*** 0.364***
(0.058) (0.118) (0.065)
Age2 -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of directors 0.048*** 0.06*** 0.048***
(0.010) (0.021) (0.013)
Firm size -0.019 0.086 -0.103
(0.213) (0.338) (0.299)
Bankers(B)’ ratio -0.638 2.719 -1.337
(1.002) (2.267) (1.166)
Bankers(B)’ ratio×ROA 0.288* 0.248 0.268
(0.154) (0.253) (0.204)
Shareholders(C)’ ratio -0.823 -0.495 -0.797
(0.783) (0.855) (2.287)
Shareholders(C)’ ratio×ROA 0.053 0.057 0.076
(0.052) (0.065) (0.235)
Cross shareholders(D)’ ratio 0.318 0.837 0.691
(0.971) (1.158) (2.293)
Cross shareholders(D)’ ratio×ROA 0.028 0.029 0.013
(0.086) (0.128) (0.127)
Pure outsiders(E)’ ratio 0.726 0.642 0.837
(0.530) (0.832) (0.736)
Pure outsiders(E)’ ratio×ROA -0.072 -0.235** 0.092
(0.084) (0.113) (0.137)
Number of observations 17501 7002 10499
Number of subjects 3641 1511 2130
Number of uncensored spells 2159 890 1269
Log likelihood -1.43E+04 -5073.195 -7759.567
chi2 2372.127 1093.875 1321.834
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.097 0.078
Notes: Number of directors includes Statutory directors. Firm size is logarithm of values of
total assets which are adjusted by consumer price index. ROA is the ratio of oprerating income
to total assets. Year dummies are included in all equations. Standard errors are in paretheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 10-, 5-, 1-percent levels, respectively.
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33Table 8. GMM: Pure Outsider’s ratio
Variable Model1 Model2






Number of directors -0.001* -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001)




Sargan test 26.21 26.5
[0.8582] [0.8486]
Arellano-Bond LM test -0.63 -0.62
[0.5266] [0.5338]
Number of observations 1419 1419
Notes: The Sargan test staticstics follow a χ2 distribution.
The Arellano-Bond LM test statistics, which correspond to
m2 test statistics in original paper, follow the standard nor-
mal distribution. Year dummies are included in all equa-
tions. Standard errors are in paretheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate
signiﬁcance at the 10-, 5-, 1-percent levels, respectively. P-
values are in [ ].
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